The margin to burst must be shown by test, validated analysis, or a combination thereof. If cooling is required to satisfy the safety analysis as described in AM1.2717, the cooling-system monitoring features and usage must be documented in the engine installation manual. (a) The design and construction of the engine and the materials used must minimize the probability of the occurrence and spread of fire during normal operation and failure conditions and must minimize the effect of such a fire. (6) Be designed to retain energy under all likely operating conditions and to minimize hazards to occupants and first responders following an emergency landing or otherwise survivable impact (crash landing). (b) The applicant must determine climb performance accounting for any critical change of thrust.
- Although the FAA’s “essential” and increased” performance approvals are similar to EASA’s “Category Basic” and “Category Enhanced” approvals, differences remain.
- The FAA also received a comment to revise AM1.2335(b) to require protection against catastrophic and hazardous effects.
- The expectation is that a system recovers normal operation of a function without impact to safety of flight by design.
- For the existing regulations that were included without modification, the proposed airworthiness criteria included all amendments to the existing parts 23, 33, and 35 airworthiness standards in effect as of the application date of March 30, 2022.
§ 35.7 Features and Characteristics
The mechanisms that can drive electric engines to an overspeed condition are different from those that govern combustion engines. One commenter recommended replacing the phrase “intended aircraft application” throughout subpart H with language specific to the Model M001 design. Another commenter recommended replacing “declared environmental limits” with “aircraft environmental and operating limitations” throughout subpart H. https://www.bookstime.com/articles/operating-cycle The FAA does not agree that more specific language is necessary, as “intended aircraft application” and “declared environmental limits” are sufficient to meet the electric engine certification requirements. Lastly, the FAA received several comments on proposed AM1.2165(a), requesting that the FAA explain why the reference to the icing conditions defined in appendix C of part 25 was excluded from these airworthiness criteria.
A35.4 Airworthiness Limitations Section
Fred Hopkins Obituary (1932 – 2022) – State College, PA – Centre Daily Times – Legacy.com
Fred Hopkins Obituary (1932 – – State College, PA – Centre Daily Times.
Posted: Sun, 16 Oct 2022 07:00:00 GMT [source]
Because Archer is not seeking FIKI approval at this time, the FAA determined in response to comments from EASA, GAMA, and Overair, that proposed AM1.2165(a) should not be adopted in these final airworthiness criteria. Should Archer seek icing certification through an amendment to their type certificate after initial type certification, appropriate icing standards will be defined as part of that project. This will allow Archer to seek a standard that reflects their operating limitations and specifics of their design. Several commenters asked for clarification on AM1.2105(g) and the use of system safety or operational mitigations as the compliance showing. Revised AM1.2105(g) is intended to assure that in the event of cockpit mismanagement, energy exhaustion, improper maintenance, or other failures, a controlled emergency landing can be achieved.
- Revised AM1.2105(g) is intended to assure that in the event of cockpit mismanagement, energy exhaustion, improper maintenance, or other failures, a controlled emergency landing can be achieved.
- The minimum safe speed determined in AM1.2110 must cover all phases of flight (including hover) and all sources of lift, and AM1.2150 uses that minimum safe speed.
- As such, the FAA has included a definition of “critical change of thrust” to address the thrust’s magnitude and orientation.
- The aircraft safety analysis uses the propeller failure rate data to show that the aircraft will not experience any catastrophic effects.
- As a fast-growing venture-stage business, you need an agile partner who can support your evolving needs.
§ 23.2235 Structural Strength
The FAA also received a request to revise AM1.2110 to require minimum safe speed for “each flight condition and configuration” instead of only for each flight condition. The phrase “flight condition” includes the aircraft configuration, phases of flight, and the sources of lift. Further, the proposed definition for “loss of power/thrust” was not adopted in these final airworthiness criteria. The FAA has modified the definition of “CSFL” to establish the different expected outcomes based on the performance approval sought. The definition of “CSFL” was modified slightly for the essential performance approval to include pilot alertness; however, the ability to continue to the planned destination or alternate is a requirement to meet the increased performance approval.
- The FAA agrees with the concern and updated AM1.2000(c) to clarify that part 33 and part 35 requirements that use the terms “airplane” and “rotorcraft” mean “aircraft.” This also prompted the FAA to remove the inappropriate reference to typical airplane installations in § 35.37(c)(2).
- The FAA does not find the level of safety outlined in SC-VTOL for “Category Enhanced” to be applicable to the Model M001 engine failure classifications, which could be minor, major, or hazardous, but not catastrophic.
- We have also provided you with online resources to assist in the tax process and financial decision-making.
- The definition of “CSFL” was modified slightly for the essential performance approval to include pilot alertness; however, the ability to continue to the planned destination or alternate is a requirement to meet the increased performance approval.
- The system must be designed to provide electrical power so that the loss, malfunction, or interruption of the electrical power source will not result in a hazardous engine effect, as defined in AM1.2717(d)(2).
- The FAA received a comment stating that 14 CFR part 23 amendment 23-64’s requirements for flight controls should be sufficient for the Model M001 and the FAA should use those requirements.
Another commenter noted the proposed requirement to comply with § 33.75(e)(1) includes a reference to § 33.4 (ICA), although the proposed airworthiness criteria do not include a requirement to comply with § 33.4. The commenter recommended either removing the propeller accounting reference to § 33.4 or adding a reference to Appendix 1, AAM1.2701, A33.2, A33.3, and A33.4. The FAA proposed AM1.2717 to include those safety analysis standards from § 33.75 that could not be required directly for the Model M001 without modification.
AM1.2725 Operation Demonstration
The FAA received a comment that determining the performance for all potential partial loss of power conditions in proposed subpart B may be impractical. As mentioned previously, a new term, “critical change of thrust” has been defined in AM1.2000 to identify the most critical thrust-related failure condition(s) for the Model M001 powered-lift. This term requires consideration of the most adverse effect on performance or handling qualities.
The proposed airworthiness criteria considered inadvertent exposure to lightning producing environments, including flight into clouds, as well as cold or icy weather conditions. The FAA determined that the highly integrated systems of the Model M001 aircraft require lightning protection. One commenter requested the FAA consider EASA’s Special Condition E-19 EHPS.260.
(2) Include limitations, unless the limitations cannot be exceeded in all intended operations. (b) The aircraft must be protected against hazardous effects caused by an accumulation of electrostatic charge. (a) The aircraft must be protected against catastrophic effects from lightning. (d) The control system must be free from jamming, excessive friction, and excessive deflection when the aircraft is subjected to expected limit airloads. (f) Engine-driven lifting-device rotational speed and ranges, and the maximum rearward and sideward flight speeds. (2) The aircraft must exhibit lateral-directional dynamic stability inclusive of likely failures.
The engine control system must be capable of resuming normal operation when aircraft-supplied power returns to within the declared limits. Pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following airworthiness criteria are issued as part of the type certification basis for the Model M001 powered-lift. The FAA finds these criteria to be appropriate for the aircraft and applicable to the specific type design and provide an equivalent level of safety to existing airworthiness standards.